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Introduction
This paper studies the problem of fairly allocating an amount of a divisible resource among agents whose preferences are single-peaked (Sprumont, 1991 ). An allocation rule, or simply a rule, is a function which maps each single-peaked preference profile to an allocation. The fairness property of the rules we are interested in is envyfreeness, which states that, at any chosen allocation, no one should prefer anyone else's consumption to her own (Foley, 1967) . The practicality condition we are interested in is peak-only, which states that the choice of allocations should only depend on the peaks of preferences. We say "practical," since the user of any peakonly rule only needs information on peak amounts of individual preferences, instead of all complicated details.
Our purpose is to study various envy-free and peak-only rules and to clarify the structure of the set of those rules. We do not impose efficiency, although our main results are deeply related to it. The aim is to extract pure implications of envy-freeness and peak-only as much as possible. However, it will turn out that the absence of efficiency does clarify the role of efficiency in some existing results in the literature, and in this sense, we are studying efficiency.
We have two main theorems. In our first main theorem, we show that a rule is envy-free and peak-only if and only if it satisfies Kolm's strong fairness condition of convex envy-freeness and some mild conditions, and also offer a functional characterization of any such rule. Furthermore, it is proved that the set of these rules forms a complete lattice with respect to a dominance relation. In our second main theorem, we impose strategy-proofness on envy-free and peak-only rules. We then offer a functional characterization of any such rule and prove that the set of these rules also forms a complete lattice with respect to the dominance relation. In both theorems, the unique upper (resp. lower) bound of the dominance relation is the uniform (resp. equal division) rule, and any other rule lies between the two rules. This implies that, in the choice problem of a rule from the set of these rules, there is always the unanimous agreement that the uniform rule is the best and the equal division rule is the worst.
Our work particularly follows the interesting works by Thomson (1994) , Chun (2000) , and Kesten (2006) . Thomson (1994) shows that the uniform rule is the only efficient, envy-free, and peak-only rule, and Chun (2000) shows that the uniform rule is the only efficient and convex envy-free rule. Our results give some insights into the role of efficiency in the list of their axioms, since the results do not rely on efficiency with keeping other axioms. Kesten (2006) shows that any envy-free and peak-only rule is convex envy-free. He also points out Paretian dominance relations over the set of convex envy-free allocations. Our work can be seen as an extension of his work that offers full characterizations of some convex envy-free rules and sets of the rules.
1
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 offers the model. Section 3 presents main results. Section 4 concludes the paper. Some proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
Basic definitions

Model
Let N ≡ {1, 2, . . . , n} be the finite set of agents. There is a fixed amount of an infinitely divisible resource Ω > 0 to be allocated. An
A single-peaked preference is a transitive, complete, and continuous binary relation R i over [0, Ω] for which there exists a unique point p i ∈ [0, Ω] such that for each
where the symmetric and asymmetric parts of R i are denoted by I i and P i , respectively. The point p i is called the peak of R i , and the profile of peaks is denoted by p ≡ (p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p n ). Let R be the set of single-peaked preferences and R N the set of single-peaked preference profiles R ≡ (R 1 , R 2 , . . . , R n ).
Axioms and rules
A rule is a function f : R N → X which maps a preference profile R ∈ R N to an
Let F be the set of rules. The following axioms of rules are standard:
• Envy-freeness (Foley, 1967) 
envy-free for R.
• Convex envy-freeness (Kolm, 1973) : An allocation x ∈ X is convex envy-free
• Peak-only:
• Strategy-proofness:
• Non-bossiness:
We also introduce much weaker versions of strategy-proofness and non-bossiness, which only concern preferences with unchanged peaks. They are also trivially implied by peak-only.
• Strategy-proofness for same peaks: For each R ∈ R N , each i ∈ N , and each
• Non-bossiness for same peaks:
Since the seminal works by Benassy (1982) and Sprumont (1991) , the following rule has played the central role in the literature.
2 It satisfies all the axioms defined above:
where λ solves
The next rule satisfies all the axioms except for efficiency.
Binary relations
This subsection introduces some standard definitions on binary relations.
Partial ordering.
A binary relation on a set A is a partial ordering if it satisfies:
• Reflexivity: For each a ∈ A, a a, Then a pair (A, ) is called a partially ordered set.
Linear ordering. A binary relation on a set A is a linear ordering if it is a partial ordering that satisfies:
Then a pair (A, ) is called a linearly ordered set.
Lattice theoretic notions. Consider a partial ordering on a set A.
• Join: Given B ⊆ A, an element a ∈ A is the join of B for if it is the least maximal of B according to ; that is, (i) for each b ∈ B, a b and
• Meet: Similarly, an element a ∈ A is the meet of B for if it is the greatest minimal of B; that is, (i) for each b ∈ B, b a and (ii) for each
• Lattice: A partially ordered set (A, ) is a lattice if for each a, b ∈ A, there exist the join and meet of {a, b} for .
• Complete lattice: A partially ordered set (A, ) is a complete lattice if for each B ⊆ A, there exist the join and meet of B for .
If they exist, the join and the meet of B are uniquely determined by antisymmetry of .
Given Y ⊆ X and R ∈ R N , the dominance relation on Y , dom [R] , is defined to be the binary relation on Y such that for each x, y ∈ Y ,
We shall analyze the order structure of any set G ⊆ F . The dominance relation on G is denoted by dom, which is defined by, for each f, g ∈ G ,
Note that dom is a partial ordering on G . In particular, we denote by F e ⊆ F the set of envy-free and peak-only rules and by dom e the dominance relation on F e , and by F es ⊆ F the set of envy-free, peak-only, and strategy-proof rules and by dom es the dominance relation on F es . These notations will appear in the proofs of Theorems 1 and 2.
Characterizations
We offer a series of propositions that characterize certain geometric properties or axiomatic relations concerning convex envy-free allocations. To do so, it is convenient to denote by C(R) ⊆ X the set of convex envy-free allocations for R. These propositions will be finalized into our main theorems.
Proposition 1. An allocation x ∈ X is convex envy-free for R ∈ R N if and only if
for each i ∈ N ,
Proof. It is easy to check the "if" part. Let us prove the "only if" part.
The variance function is a function var :
The second proposition clarifies how convex envy-free allocations can be mutually compared in view of variance or dominance.
Proposition 2. For every R ∈ R N and every x, y ∈ C(R),
Proof. See, the Appendix.
The fact that the variance of the uniform allocation is larger than that of any other convex envy-free allocation is first shown by Chun (2000) . This is a converse implication to a result by Schummer and Thomson (1997) which states that the variance of the uniform allocation is always smaller than that of any other efficient allocation. (C3) is first obtained by Kesten (2006, Proposition 3) . Kesten (2006, pp. 199-200 ) also mentions a procedure that obtains all convex envy-free allocations from the equal division allocation, and then points out that all convex envy-free allocations are Pareto ranked. Our Proposition 2 can be seen as a completion of their arguments that offers full details of relations among convex envy-free allocations.
Proposition 3. For each R, R
′ ∈ R N with p = p ′ , C(R) = C(R ′ ).
Proof. It suffices to show that for each R, R
we have x ∈ C(R ′ ). To do so, we shall prove that, given any i ∈ N and any a ∈ [x, x],
Proposition 3 does not imply that all convex envy-free rules are peak-only, since the choice of one allocation from the same set C(R) = C(R ′ ) may depend on information other than peaks. However, the next result shows that, under mild conditions, convex envy-freeness in fact implies peak-only.
Proposition 4. If a rule is convex envy-free, strategy-proof for same peaks, and non-bossy for same peaks, then it is peak-only.
Proof. Let f be any convex envy-free, strategy-proof for same peaks, and non-bossy for same peaks rule. By non-bossiness for same peaks, it suffices to show that for each R ∈ R N , i ∈ N , and each R
, since the other subcase can be parallely shown. Then Proposition 1 implies
but this contradicts the definition of allocations.
The next result by Kesten (2006, Proposition 1) is somewhat a converse of Proposition 4. We give a proof for completeness.
Proposition 5. If a rule is envy-free and peak-only, then it is convex envy-free.
Proof. Let f be an envy-free and peak-only rule. Pick any R ∈ R N . By Proposition 1, we need to show that
by peak-only, a contradiction. The parallel proof applies to the case f i (R) < p i .
We are now in a position to offer our first main theorem: Theorem 1. The following three statements on any rule f are equivalent:
is envy-free and peak-only; (ii) f is convex envy-free, strategy-proof for same peaks, and non-bossy for same peaks; (iii) There exists a function g : [0, Ω]
N → X such that for each R ∈ R N and each
Furthermore, the set of these rules is a complete lattice with respect to the dominance relation, whose greatest, least elements are the uniform rule, the equal division rule, respectively.
Proof. The equivalence between (i) and (ii) follows from Propositions 4 and 5. The equivalence between (i) and (iii) follows from Proposition 1.
We next show that (F e , dom e ) is a complete lattice. Let G ⊆ F e . Define the
where x is chosen such that x ∈ C(R) and
Note that the existence of x follows from the compactness of C(R) and the uniqueness of x follows from Proposition 2. Thus ∨ G is well-defined. Obviously, ∨ G is the unique least upper bound of G . The unique greatest lower bound of G can be parallely found. Thus (F e , dom e ) is a complete lattice.
The fact that the uniform, the equal division rules are the greatest, least elements of (F e , dom e ), respectively, immediately follows from Proposition 2. Thomson (1994, Lemma 1) shows that the uniform rule is the only efficient, envy-free, and peak-only rule. The equivalence between (i) and (iii) in Theorem 1 clarifies what happens if efficiency is dropped from the list of Thomson's axioms. Theorem 1 also implies that, under envy-freeness and peak-only, the uniform rule can be selected without caring who gains or loses from the choice of rules, since everyone gains by the use of the uniform rule independent of their preferences.
Given Theorem 1, a natural question is if there is any interesting sublattice. We consider this question for the strategy-proof subclass.
Theorem 2. The following three statements on any rule f are equivalent: envy-free, strategy-proof, and peak-only; (ii) f is convex envy-free, strategy-proof, and non-bossy for same peaks;
Proof. The equivalence between (i) and (ii) follows from Propositions 4 and 5. One can easily show that (iii) implies (i).
Let us prove that (i) implies (iii). Pick any envy-free, strategy-proof, and peakonly rule f and let g : [0, Ω] N → X be the associated function satisfying the conditions in (iii) of Theorem 1. For each i ∈ N , define two functions
By strategy-proofness, i has no incentive to report peak Ω when her true peak is zero, and hence
Similarly, one can easily show by strategy-proofness
, then by strategy-proofness and peak-only,
In either case, we obtain 
For each i ∈ N , each R ∈ R N , and each R ′ i ∈ R, by strategy-proofness,
For each i ∈ N , each R ∈ R N , and each R ′ i ∈ R, (1) and (2) together imply
and then by definition of
Therefore, (F es , dom es ) is a complete lattice.
Conclusion
We characterized envy-free and peak-only rules and clarified the complete lattice structure of the class of these rules. We also imposed strategy-proofness to the rules and then identified functional forms of the rules and again found the complete lattice structure of the strategy-proof subclass. These results enable us to easily compare any two such rules in view of dominance relations and suggest how strong the position of the uniform rule is and how weak the position of the equal division rule. In general, this kind of easy-to-compare relations is rarely observed, except for two-sided matching problems (e.g., Roth and Sotomayor, 1990) . Thus results like ours are rather infrequent. In the theorems, we found the existence of certain functions characterizing rules, but did not clarify concrete forms of the functions. Since they seem to have non-trivial complicated forms, obtaining simpler forms by imposing additional axioms is of interest as a future research.
By Lemma 2,
By Lemmas 1 and 2,
By Lemma 1,
Since ∑ i∈N x i = ∑ i∈N y i , (7)- (10) together imply x = y.
Lemma 4. For each R ∈ R N and each x, y ∈ C(R), if x < y, then y < x.
Proof. Suppose, by contradiction, that there exist R ∈ R N and x, y ∈ C(R) such that x < y and x ≤ y. By feasibility, x < y ≤ x ≤ y and y < y. By Lemmas 1 and 2,
y < p i =⇒ x i = x ≤ y = y i .
For j ∈ N such that x j = x, Lemma 1 implies p j ≤ x, so x j < y j . Hence, (11)-(15) together imply ∑ i∈N x i < ∑ i∈N y i , a contradiction.
Lemma 5. For each R ∈ R N and each x, y ∈ C(R), if x < y, then x dom[R] y and not y dom[R] x.
Proof. Immediately follows from Lemmas 1-4.
Proof of Proposition 2. (C1) and (C2) immediately follow from Lemmas 1-5.
(C3) is a direct consequence from (C1) and (C2).
